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ABSTRACT
Previous research suggests that the organizational cue, connectedness, can
influence time judgments of geometric shapes. The stimuli of those experiments
consisted of geometric shapes with lines. In the organized set of stimuli, the lines joined
the shapes together , and in the unorganized set of stimuli, the lines floated in whitespace
amongst the shapes. However, connectedness affected time judgments in two seemingly
opposing directions in previous experiments. The current experiment sought to clarify
the differences between the results of the earlier experiments by modifying the
instructions of the second task to have participants count the number of disjoint shapes.
In this experiment, there were no differences between the time judgments for the
organized and unorganized images. The results may suggest that the way the participants
interpret the stimuli influence their time judgments.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Our perception of time keeps us organized. We keep track of time so we know
when to begin and end tasks. However, our perception of time is easily manipulated. On
the best of days, we simply know when it has been long enough to check the clock for the
real time. The goal of this master's thesis is to further investigate how time can be
manipulated.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Timekeeping Models
There is some debate about how we keep track of time, but there are two broad
classes of timekeeping models: dedicated models and intrinsic models (Ivry & Schlerf,
2008). Dedicated models suggest that modular regions in the brain are responsible for
timekeeping. Modular regions are areas with one specialized function. Regions
implicated as assisting in timekeeping include the cerebellum, the frontal and parietal
lobes, as well as the basal ganglia (Grondin, 2010). In these dedicated models, each
region has its own designated task having to do with tracking time. In one variant, an
oscillator region generates pulses, and the more pulses that are detected by a counter, the
greater the amount of time that is perceived by the person (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). These
make up an kind of "internal clock." When resources are taken away from the regions
responsible for counting pulses, time seems to become shorter. Thus, easier tasks should
seem to last longer because you have more resources to catch pulses.
However, dedicated models that suggest that we have an internal clock cannot
explain how factors outside of the supposedly modular regions affect time judgments
without contradicting themselves (Birth, 2014). Once activity from the "non-dedicated"
regions affects the theoretical modular clock's timekeeping performance, it is no longer a
clock. This is because performance is impacted by the activity or inactivity of other
processes, which should not be the case if the tool is like a clock.
Intrinsic models suggest that our general brain processing can be used to generate
time perception (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). Time is something inherent in what the brain is
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processing and perceiving that allows the person to make an educated guess about
duration. One popular intrinsic model is the energy model. In this model, time
judgments can be influenced by the amount of energy involved in processing (Eagleman
& Pariyadath, 2009). Eagleman and Pariyadath suggest that the energy used at the
neuronal level can predict time judgments. Efficiently coded processes will lead to
shorter duration judgments because they consume less energy. A duration in which
minimal energy is used to process stimuli will be judged as shorter than a duration in
which a larger amount of energy is used to process stimuli. However, intrinsic models
are often flexible to the point that they cannot easily narrow down the how the brain
tracks time.
Factors Affecting Time Perception
Energy efficiency.
Consistent with the idea that simply varying neural energy can affect time
judgments, duration judgments are affected by many different sensory factors. For
example, when a stimulus is an unexpected occurrence (an oddball), it seems to last for a
longer amount of time than an expected stimulus when they had the same duration
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007). According to the energy model, this is because the
expected stimuli are processed more efficiently and take less energy.
However, there are results that conflict with the energy model. Increasing the
participants' cognitive workload with a secondary task sometimes seems to cause a
decrease in the subjective duration (Molet, Alessandri, & Zentall, 2011; Zakay, Nitzan, &
Glicksohn, 1983). Molet et al. (2011) suggested that increasing cognitive load led to
underestimation because participants paid less attention to the time judgments;
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furthermore, they found that increased physical activity led to the participants
overestimating the duration, but they were uncertain of the cause. They proposed that
physical activity made the participants' internal-clocks more sensitive to the generated
pulses. However, the reasons for the discrepancies between the energy model and the
results are unclear.
Emotional responses.
In the Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007) experiment, they increased the emotional
salience of the oddball images to see if the salience would impact participants’ duration
judgments further (Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007). Emotional salience is related to the
attention grabbing ability of the image due to the activation of the amygdale. While the
emotional salience did not increase the magnitude of the effects already present with
oddball stimuli in that experiment, the emotional responses of participants can impact
their perception of time (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; Smith, McIver, Di Nella, & Crease,
2011). However, emotional response had various influences on the time judgments based
on the image arousal rating and the range of the potential image durations. For example,
when images were presented for 100-300 ms, negative images were perceived as lasting
for less time than their true duration; but, when images were presented from 400-1600
ms, emotionally negative images were judged as lasting longer than positive images
when they were both highly arousing (Smith et al., 2011). Similarly, when color is
perceived as emotionally positive or negative, positive colors lead to underestimation of
duration while negative colors lead to overestimations (Gorn, Chattopadhyay, Sengupta,
& Tripathi, 2004).
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Visual processing.
With the energy model in mind, other activity, such as visual processing, would
influence timekeeping. Visual resources can be used by other brain regions using
common formatting (Cavanagh, 2011). The information related to visually perceived
objects can be communicated with the rest of the brain for additional mid- to high-level
processing. Because time judgments may be processed using non-time specific
resources, the information derived from objects could be used to compute the elapsed
duration. As an example, someone monitoring the position of a second hand on a clock
could track time relatively easily.
As a less apparent example of the influence of visual perception on time-keeping,
some scene characteristics may affect temporal processing: there is evidence to suggest
that scenes with unorganized structures are judged as lasting for a shorter amount of time
than scenes with normal structure (Varakin, Klemes, & Porter, 2013). The authors
believe that the normal, organized scenes provide a more complex, complete picture than
the unorganized scenes (see Figure 1 for sample images1). If the scene types have
different levels of complexity, there will be different amounts of energy expenditure per
scene type. According to the energy model, this will lead to differences in the scenes'
perceived durations: compared to the unorganized scenes, participants would use more
energy to process the normal scenes; this is not necessarily linked to the idea that one
type is processed more or less efficiently (as in Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007); instead,
normal images may use more energy while being processed by participants. The
unorganized images' contents may be dismissed because of the lack of time to process

1

All figures are in the appendices.
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and/or mentally rearrange them, leading to less energy expenditure and a relatively
shorter perceived duration.
Sound effects.
Other forms of information can influence our perception of time. The difference
in the pitch of two sounds being played can influence participants' duration judgments
(Crowder & Neath, 1995). When two consecutive tones are played, two very different
pitches are judged as lasting longer than two very similar pitches, even when they are
played for the same amount of time.
Sound and light interactions.
The modality of stimuli can change the participants' duration judgments: soundbased stimuli are judged as lasting longer than vision-based stimuli of the same duration
(Goldstone & Lhamon, 1974; Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, & Percival, 1998). Further, the
interaction of these two modalities can be exploited to distort duration judgments by
intentionally exposing participants to incongruent sensory information (Van Wassenhove,
Buonomano, Shimojo, & Shams, 2008). The perceived duration of sounds could be
influenced by the alteration of the duration of accompanying light, but not vice versa. A
sound was judged as lasting longer than it really did when the accompanying visual
stimulus lasted for a relatively longer amount of time, and a sound was judged as lasting
shorter when the accompanying visual stimulus lasted for a relatively shorter amount of
time (Van Wassenhove et al., 2008). However, the duration judgments about light were
not influenced by varying the duration of the accompanying sound.
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Magnitude effects.
Considering visual stimuli in general, stimuli with visual attributes of higher
magnitudes (brightness, numerosity, color saturation, etc. (Alards-Tomalin, LeboeMcGowan, Shaw, & Leboe-McGowan, 2014) lead to overestimations of the elapsed time
when compared to the attributes with lower magnitudes (Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen,
2007). Four attributes were tested by Xuan et al. (2007): physical size, luminance,
number of objects, and scalar magnitude. The greater the magnitude, the greater the
subjective duration. Other researchers agree that larger stimuli are judged as lasting
longer than smaller stimuli (Ono & Kawahara, 2007).
Motion effects.
When considering motion, acceleration can also lead to interesting effects on time
judgments: when objects are accelerating and then become invisible, the time until the
object would reach a point on the screen if the acceleration was constant is overestimated
because further acceleration is not taken into account (Bootsma & Oudejans, 1993).
Likewise, participants underestimate the time that elapses when the object is decelerating.
The Temporal Bisection Task
There are a few ways to go about evaluating how participants perceive time. For
instance, participants could report numeric durations that correspond to the presence of
some observed stimuli. Alternatively, participants could hold a button on a computer for
the amount of time they believed a stimulus was present. In these methods, the true times
could be compared to the participants' perceived times to evaluate whether there were
differences between the real and subjective durations. However, recognizing that the
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participants' perceptions are their reality, this study made use of the temporal bisection
task to compare the subjective duration judgments of sets of stimuli.
When testing for many of these time judgment differences, researchers often use a
temporal bisection task. The temporal bisection task is a useful method for comparing
how long stimuli are subjectively judged to last relative to one another. In a temporal
bisection task, participants judge each trial's stimulus duration as closer to either a short
standard time (e.g., 400 ms) or a long standard time (e.g., 1600 ms). Having a stimulus
duration of 1000 ms while using a short standard of 400 ms and a long standard of 1600
ms creates a fairly ambiguous situation because 1000 ms is exactly between the two
standards by which the participants are making their judgments. As the correct duration
judgment becomes more ambiguous to the participant, the probability of the participant
judging the duration as long or short becomes more similar.
Experimenters use the temporal bisection task to find the duration at which the
participants respond "long" 50% of the time; this duration is known as a bisection point
(aka, point of subjective equality). Because the participants respond long and short 50%
of the time at the bisection point, that duration represents the turning point in the
participants' judgment about the duration. The lower the duration of the bisection point,
the earlier the participants begin to judge stimuli as "long." Thus, images with relatively
lower bisection points are generally judged as lasting longer than images with relatively
higher bisection points. When the standards are 400 and 1600 ms, one might think that
1000 ms would be the bisection point every time, but because of the malleable nature of
time perception, the bisection point varies between people and stimuli.
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Using a stimulus set in which every stimulus shares a common feature (i.e., a
high-level [organization, orientation, etc] or a low-level [brightness, contrast, etc] feature)
the stimulus set's average bisection point can be compared to that of another stimulus
set's average bisection point. This is done to compare the two sets' biases regarding
duration judgments. Some features may create more bias than others (in a consistent
direction). As such, bisection points are ideal for comparing the effects of specific
features on time perception.
Connectedness
Given that the organization of complex scenes has been tied to changes in time
judgments (Varakin et al., 2013), the organization of simpler sets of stimuli may be able
to reproduce the effects. Hays and Varakin (2015) selected the perceptual organization
cue of connectedness to produce the organizational effects in a controlled way (see
Figure 2 for sample stimuli). This cue is easily applied and manipulated to create
organized and unorganized scenes.
Connectedness experiments.
Thus far, two experiments have been conducted regarding perceptual organization
and time perception (Hays & Varakin, 2015). These two experiments investigated how
organization would influence the duration judgments through temporal bisection tasks.
The goal of the first experiment was to test whether or not simple geometric arrays could
reproduce the earlier effects of scene organization (Varakin et al., 2013). In Experiment
1, participants (n=26) judged unorganized stimuli as lasting longer than organized stimuli
(Hays & Varakin, 2015). This result contradicted the hypothesis, based on the Varakin et
al. (2013), that organized stimuli would last for a longer time than unorganized stimuli.
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The goal of the second experiment was to see how attending to the features within
the stimuli, as well as attending to duration, may influence the duration judgments of the
stimuli (Hays & Varakin, 2015). Thus, a second task was added to direct attention to the
specific organizational features of the stimuli. The results of this experiment reversed the
initial results; now, organized stimuli were judged as lasting longer than unorganized
stimuli, which was consistent with the original hypothesis. The present experiment was
designed to understand the basis for the contrasting findings of these initial
connectedness experiments.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION
The results from Hays and Varakin (2015) suggest that inherent stimuli properties
are not enough to consistently predict the participants' time judgments. Possibly, the
focus of the secondary tasks can also influence the way in which participants create time
judgments. This may be because there are multiple characteristics that influence duration
judgments that can create contradictory judgments under different contexts. If that is the
case, the task simply emphasizes the importance of characteristics to which participants
attend. Furthermore, participants would then use information related to the attended
characteristics to create time judgments.
Connectedness is an organizational cue that involves the formation of shapes and
groups based on whether they are physically joined by lines or shapes. In previous
research, Gestalt cues (i.e., grouping by similarity) were not perceived when they were
not relevant (Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992). This demonstrates that some
Gestalt cues are not noticed by participants if they are not looking for them. Further
research suggests that some aspects of connectedness are processed pre-attentively while
others are not (Trick & Enns, 1997). In particular, specific shape formation (where the
points of a polygon are connected by lines) seems to require conscious attention while
clumping components together as a "shapeless blob" does not.
Thus, the organization of the stimuli may have been interpreted differently in the
first two Hays and Varakin experiments (2015). In the first experiment, when
connectedness was not being attended to by the participants through a classification task,
the difference in magnitude (the difference in the number of separate objects) may have
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been the primary influence on the participants' time judgments. This is consistent with
the idea that the objects within an organized array were perceived as one solid clump
without any relationship information. Previous research also suggests that stimuli with a
larger number of objects should be judged as lasting for a longer amount of time than
stimuli with fewer objects (Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014). Matching this idea, organized
arrays have fewer separated objects than unorganized arrays, and they were judged as
short more often than the unorganized arrays in Experiment 1.
In the second experiment of Hays and Varakin (2015), there was a second task
that directed attention to the organizational features: in half of the trials (which were
randomly mixed with time judgment trials), participants classified the stimuli as
organized or unorganized. With the additional task and trials, participants judged the
organized stimuli as lasting longer than the unorganized stimuli. Perhaps the results of
Experiment 2 were the reverse of Experiment 1 because the Gestalt cues were now a
relevant, attended factor in Experiment 2. If the relationships between shapes and lines
were only noticed in Experiment 2, their additional cognitive "information" may have
contributed to the amount of energy required to process the organized stimuli, thus
increasing subjective duration.
There are alternate explanations however. The change in results of Experiment 2
could be due to fatigue effects from having more trials than Experiment 1. Furthermore,
the introduction of the second task may have interfered with participants’ ability to
accurately track the passage of time (Brown & Boltz, 2002; Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, &
Cavanagh, 2004). Finally, perhaps just paying attention to the arrays causes the
mismatch.
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Thus, the present experiment sought to further test the malleability of the
direction of the time judgments' biases by having participants view the stimuli as they
were shown in Experiment 2 with a different set of instructions. The focus of the
instructions were shifted away from the connectedness cue, making the specific cues
task-irrelevant once again. Instead, the stimuli were classified as having "six separate
objects" or "two separate objects" (formerly known as unorganized and organized arrays,
respectively). The goal was to direct the focus to the quantity rather than the
organizational cue to see how the participants judge the duration under the new set of
instructions. We know from previous experiments that arrays with more objects are
normally judged as longer than arrays with fewer objects (Xuan et al., 2007). If the
participants judged the two-object arrays as lasting longer than the six-object arrays (as in
Experiment 2), then this would indicate an effect of attention, fatigue, or some other
factor that needs to be explored. However, if the participants judge the two-object arrays
as lasting for a shorter amount of time than the six-object arrays (as in Experiment 1),
then this would support the idea that task-relevant attributes (such as connectedness or
number) are important for influencing time perception.
To summarize, if changing the tasks leads to a different direction in time bias
compared to Experiment 2, then there is evidence to suggest that time judgments are
dependent on the task-relevant features of the visual stimuli being processed (i.e.,
connectedness and number), rather than time biases being dependent on either an
absolute set of features (such as luminance, number, etc) inherent to the stimuli
themselves or the introduction of a second task. Between Experiments 1 and 2, the cause
of the change in results is ambiguous because of the difference in the number of tasks and
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the number of trials. This experiment will have the same number of tasks and trials as
Experiment 2, but predict the same results as Experiment 1.
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CHAPTER 4
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-six students from Eastern Kentucky University (23 females, Mage = 21, SD
= 3) were enlisted using either the SONA system or a prepared verbal script. In order to
participate, participants had to be 18 or older, have normal or corrected vision, and have
no neurological disorders.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The same stimuli and equipment were used by Hays and Varakin (2015) in their
second experiment. Two iMac computers with 21.5-inch widescreen LED-backlit
monitors were used to present the stimuli on PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). During the main
experiment, there were two types of images: organized and unorganized images. In each
image (see Figure 2), there were always 4 main shapes; the type, size, rotation, and color
of each shape varied across images. Each shape was either a circle, a square, or a
triangle. These shapes could were made to fit within circles ranging from 20 pixels in
diameter to 70 pixels in diameter, but the sizes were chosen at random for every shape.
The triangle was scaled to fit from a polygon with the points: (1,2), (0,0), (2,0). The
colors could only vary between solid green, blue, and red. There were also always two
lines, but the length, thickness, color, and rotation also varied. The lines in organized
images always connected two shapes together without intersecting any of the other
shapes or the other line. The lines in unorganized images were always drawn in
whitespace. Each of the 50 organized images had a corresponding unorganized image. A
corresponding image had the same shapes in the same positions, but organized images
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have shapes which are connected by lines while unorganized images have the same lines
floating in a random position in space that does not overlap any other line or shape.
Procedure
The procedure is nearly identical to Experiment 2 by Hays and Varakin (2015).
Throughout the experiment, the participants sat at an iMac workstation. On the
computer, they entered the demographics for age, gender, and handedness, and were then
presented with an initial set of instructions for the training phase. They were encouraged
to ask questions at this point or during the training phase. The participants were
instructed to put on a set of noise cancelling headphones for the remainder of the
experiment.
During the training phase, participants judged the duration of a black outline of a
box displayed onscreen as being either a long standard (1600 ms) or a short standard (400
ms). The participants used the "4" and "6" keys to respond after the stimulus
disappeared. Before the start of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a
response mapping condition that determined which button represented "short" or "long."
During practice trials, if the participants judged the stimulus incorrectly, the computer
produced a beeping noise. After 20 successful practice trials, the instructions for the test
phase were displayed.
During the test phase, both the stimuli and the durations for which they could be
displayed were different from the training phase. In a trial, the duration could be any of
400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, or 1600 ms. Half of the trials were duration judgment
trials, and the other half consisted of classification trials. Each stimulus was displayed 4
times (twice for each task), leading to 400 trials.
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However, unlike Experiment 2 from Hays and Varakin (2015), the instructions for
the second task were changed to relate to the magnitude, or the number of separate
objects present. Rather than classifying the arrays as organized or unorganized, the
second task was to categorize the number of objects on the screen as being either "2" or
"6" (organized stimuli have two separate objects while unorganized stimuli have six
separate objects). Time judgments were made with the "4" and "6" buttons on the
keyboard number pad (with short and long being counterbalanced) and classification
judgments were made with the "2" and "8" buttons (with "2" representing 2 distinct
objects and "8" representing 6 distinct objects). During the stimulus classification task,
participants classified the stimuli as organized or unorganized based on the examples
within the instructions. Because the task was randomly selected at the end of each trial,
the participants did not know which feature they needed to report ahead of time; thus,
they needed to attend to both.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Logit models were used to estimate bisection points in SPSS; a bisection point for
each stimulus type (organized/unorganied) was computed for each participant. Across
the two response mapping conditions, the average bisection points for the two types of
organization (unorganized and organized) were compared using a mixed-ANOVA.
However, 13 participants were dropped because of poor performance on the classification
task (<90% accuracy), leaving n = 23. Regarding the main hypothesis that there would
be a difference between the two array types (organized vs. unorganized), there was no
main effect of Organization: the average bisection point for the unorganized group (M =
984 ms, SD = 247 ms) was not significantly different from the average bisection point for
the organized group (M = 989 ms, SD = 240 ms); F(1, 21) < 1, p > .05. For a comparison
of the bisection points across the experiments, see Figure 3. There was no main effect for
the response mapping condition: the average bisection point when "6" represented "long"
(M = 972 ms, SD = 334 ms) did not significantly differ from the average bisection point
when "4" represented "long" (M = 1002 ms, SD = 349 ms); F(1, 21) < 1, p > .05.
Similarly, the interaction effect between Organization and response mapping Condition
was also insignificant; F(1, 21) < 1, p > .05, see Figure 4.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
When considered alone, these results are somewhat ambiguous. The results were
inconsistent with both of the experiments by Hays and Varakin (2015). In the first
experiment, the unorganized arrays were judged as lasting longer than the organized
arrays. In the second experiment, the organized arrays were judged as lasting longer than
the unorganized arrays. In the current experiment, neither array was judged as lasting
longest.
There are several possible explanations, and the first has to do with difficulty.
When two of the same task type are done at once, the difficulty increases (Proctor & Van
Zandt, 1994). Because the current task involved two magnitude judgments (duration and
quantity), the participants could have been influenced by the difficulty of the task. The
standard deviations of the bisection points for each scene type in this experiment
(compared to Experiment 2 by Hays and Varakin, 2015) were approximately 100 ms
higher. More variability in duration judgment responses means the participants were less
able to respond consistently to the real durations. That, along with the number of
participants dropped due to their lack of accuracy, is consistent with the idea that the
difficulty increased. However, a bivariate correlation did not suggest that the participants
performed worse on one task compared to the other. Including all 36 participants (even
those who did not meet the 90% criterion), there was a significant positive correlation
between Counting Classification accuracy and Time Judgment accuracy (r = .60, p <
.001). The mean Counting Classification accuracy was 90% (SD = 11%) and the mean
Time Judgment accuracy was 87% (SD = 12%).
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Another possible explanation for these results has to do with the inability to
completely control the participants' cognitions. While attending to the number of objects
due to the explicit instructions, they may independently recognize that the organizational
cues are present. If participants recognized the presence of connectedness, it may
ultimately affect their bisection points because they would not have to count the shapes
with as much effort. Instead, they could check for the presence of a line that connects to
any shape (like in Experiment 2 by Hays and Varakin). Whether or not participants
discover this strategy could cause opposing trends in the bisection points. Consistent
with this idea, the average bisection points for the two types of organization were
approximately equal (meaning the varying "opposing" cognitive strategies could have
washed out the differences).
By changing the task slightly, the results were completely different from either
Experiments 1 or 2 by Hays and Varakin (2015). This brings up a two points worth
noting. First, the differences in results between the first and second experiments may not
be due to the introduction of the second task in experiment 2: the focus of the
participants' task (i.e., number or organization) could be important. Second, the results of
the experiments involving more trials (Experiment 2 by Hays and Varakin and this one)
may not be due to fatigue and familiarity. The results could be dependent on the way the
participants handle the visual information they perceive throughout the task.
There is further support for the idea that fatigue and familiarity did not influence
the results of experiments. In similar, concurrent research regarding time estimation in
relation to color and orientation, fatigue and familiarity were ruled out as causes of the
changes in effects (Hays, Klemes, & Varakin, 2015) by doubling the number of trials and
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maintaining the use of one task (the time judgment task). If these results generalize, they
would suggest that the participants in the present experiments were primarily influenced
by some aspect of the classification task rather than by fatigue and familiarity.
As such, despite the lack of significance, it may be possible to interpret the results
of the three connectedness experiments sensibly. First, perceiving connectedness can
influence time estimations even if the task can change the direction of that influence. In
the experiments did not invalidate the others' results; rather, they suggest cases that can
modify the influence of connectedness. Second, the focus of simultaneous tasks can
influence which information the participants use to create estimates of time. In the
second experiment by Hays and Varakin (2015), the task's goals may have successfully
directed focus to the organization of the shapes while the current experiment may have
had a mixed focus (which would be consistent with the statistically insignificant results).
Third, the demands of the tasks may influence how well the participants consistently
interpret the information used for creating estimates of time; however, the way in which
the participants cope with the demands of tasks may influence which information is
selected as well as how consistently they interpret information. In the current
experiment, the participants had to handle two magnitude tasks. In the previous
experiments by Hays and Varakin (2015), they may have had an easier time making
judgments because the tasks were more distinct: in the case of experiment 1, there was
only one task, and experiment 2 had a magnitude task and an organization classification
task rather than two magnitude tasks.
In the future, researchers should strive to create a pair of secondary tasks that are
able to successfully simulates the direction of the bisection points of the first two
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experiments by Hays and Varakin (2015). The new tasks would seek to avoid the within
task flexibility in cognitive strategies that the current counting task allows. This would
help solidify the evidence in favor of the explanation that the task is capable of shaping
the interpretation of the information that can influence the creation of an estimate of time.
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APPENDIX A
Figures

27

Normal Image

Jumbled Image

Figure 1. Scene-based Organization.
Note(s): Here is an example of an organized, normal scene and an unorganized, jumbled
scene from Varakin, Klemes, and Porter (2013).
Source(s): Varakin, D. A., Klemes, K. J., & Porter, K. A. (2013). The effect of scene
structure on time perception. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 66(8),
1639–1652.
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Unorganized, six-object array

Organized, two-object array

Figure 2. Array-based Organization.
Note(s): These images represent the two types of arrays: unorganized/six-object (left) and
organized/two-object (right). The borders were added here to clearly distinguish them,
and their dimensions are normally 640x480 (in pixels).
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Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Organized

Unorganized

Organized

n=24, p < .05, η2=.351 n=23, n.s.

Unorganized

n=26, p < .05, η2=.212
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Experiment 3

Figure 3. Experiments' Mean Bisection Points.
Note(s): This shows the average bisection points for unorganized and organized arrays
across the three experiments. The error bars represent the standard error. Only the
within experiment bisection points were compared. A relatively lower bisection point
means the stimuli it represents were judged as lasting longer at a lower duration. This is
interpreted as the participants perceiving the arrays within the relatively lower bisection
point's group as lasting longer than the arrays within the relatively higher bisection point's
group.
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Figure 4. Mean Bisection Points by Response Map.
Note(s): This shows the average bisection points for each type of organization across the
response map conditions. The interaction between the response map condition and the
organization was insignificant.
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